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DIPLOMATIC IMPUNITY:
TIME FOR A CHANGE?
1. INTRODUCTION
New York City is home to the United Nations, an international
parliamentary body representing 185 nations.' To assist the
United Nations in its endeavors, representatives of the member
States are given special privileges and immunities to carry out
their functions.2  In New York City, thousands of delegates
represent their sovereigns in the United Nations and enjoy special
immunities, including immunity from arrest or detention. These
delegates also enjoy "such other privileges and immunities, and
facilities not inconsistent [with] the foregoing as diplomatic
envoys enjoy." 3 The United States recognizes the privileges
afforded foreign diplomats in the U.S. with the understanding that
the same privileges will be afforded to American diplomats
' See Marjorie Ann Brown, Effectiveness of the United Nations, 77 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 191 (1985) The United Nations legislates
multilateral treaty law.., cover [iug] such diverse fields as
disarmament and arms control, pacific settlement of
international disputes, commercial arbitration, law of
treaties, privileges and immunities, diplomatic and consular
relations, human rights- including status of women, refugees
and stateless persons and white slavery, narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, public health, international trade
and development, transportation and communication,
navigation, economic statistics, commodities, freedom of
information, the sea, outer space, telecommunications, and
environmental matters.
Id. See also About the United Nations, (visited August 18, 1998)
<http://www.un.org./aboutun.org>.
2 See The Agreement Between the United States and the United Nations, June
26- November 21, 1947, 61 Stat. 754 (1947). Art. V (4) provides, in
pertinent part, '[r]epresentatives of member States shall, whether residing
inside or outside the headquarters district, be entitled in the territory of the
United States, to the same privileges and immunities. . . as it accords to
diplomatic envoys accredited to it." Id.
' Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 21
U.S.T. 1418, art. IV.
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abroad.4 It is the ultimate concern of the United States that its
diplomats and nationals abroad are safe and are able to carry out
their duties without fear of harassment.
While this theorem has credibility, many diplomats in the
United Nations have grossly abused these privileges in blatant
disregard to local laws, customs and citizens.' Because New
York City is home to an inordinate number of diplomats, it has
been greatly impacted by the non-observance of parking and
traffic ordinances.6 In addition to the inconvenience of illegal
parking, there are safety issues involved. Diplomats' illegally
" See 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Zaire, 988 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1993). Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement
with the defendant. Id. at 296. Defendant "repeatedly fell into arrears on its
rent." Id. Plaintiff sued, and defendant's defense was diplomatic immunity.
Id. The district court was not persuaded and granted summary judgment to
plaintiff. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Vienna
Convention was controlling. Id. at 301. Further, the court opined
"[rieforming the Vienna Convention may well be a valid objective. But
federal courts are an inappropriate forum to accomplish the amendment of a
multilateral treaty to which the United States is a party." Id. at 302.
' Often, reports are not filed by police officers for acts of diplomats because
of the futility of making a charge against a diplomat when the diplomat may
avail himself to diplomatic immunity. See Robert Ferrigno, There's Also a
Short Arm of the Law, CHI. TRm. September 27, 1987, at 1. Many other
instances of diplomatic impropriety are handle quietly by the State
Department. This is done to avoid publicizing the incidents, which would lead
to further strain on relations with the represented State. Id. In 1995, the wife
of a Nigerian diplomat allegedly slashed and stabbed her two daughters in
Maryland. Local authorities were forced to release her upon her claim of
diplomatic immunity. See Michael B. McDonough, Privileged Outlaws:
Diplomats, Crime and Immunity, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 475
(1997). See also, e.g., United States v. Guinand, 688 F. Supp. 774 (D.D.C.
1988). In Guinard, defendant was a member of the diplomatic staff of the
Embassy of Peru, and, as such, was entitled to diplomatic immunity. Id. at
774. Defendant allegedly entered into a narcotics transaction with an
undercover agent and was arrested and convicted. Id. On appeal, the court
held that defendant was not entitled to diplomatic immunity because he had
failed to depart from the United States in a reasonable time, and thus, held the
status of permanent resident alien. Id. at 777.
6 A total of 134,281 tickets were issued to and ignored by diplomats in New
York City in 1996. See Larry McShane, No Dgtente in NYC's War on U.N.
Scofflaws, TIMEs UNION, April 12, 1997, at B2.
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parked cars create congestion and block fire hydrants. As a
result of these infractions, millions of dollars in unpaid parking
fines are owed to the City of New York.7 This comment will
place the historical perspective in the treatment of diplomats and
discuss the remedies and obstacles the City of New York can
expect to encounter in attempting to gain the cooperation of the
diplomatic community in recognizing and respecting New York
City parking laws.
BACKGROUND
Man has recognized since the beginning of societal relations that
in the name of diplomacy, those who act in the name of the
sovereign need to be afforded generous treatment and protection
so that actions between peoples can commence. Primitive
societies developed procedures entitling intercommunity
messengers free movement and personal immunity while
discussing war, peace and trade.8 As noted by Abban Eban,
[t]here is a great deal of political and military diplomacy in the
biblical narrative... the kings, queens, generals and other
dignitaries are portrayed as sending messengers to adversaries in
the region, usually with such unwelcome tidings that they would
need every ounce of immunity that they could get.9
Throughout the years of Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance in Europe, diplomatic customs evolved. In Britain,
in 1708, the Russian Ambassador of Peter the Great was arrested
in the streets of London for failing to pay a debt.'0 When Peter
' Id. In 1996, the amount owed to the City of New York as a result of
unpaid parking tickets from diplomats was in excess of S6 million. Id.
8 RAGNAR NUMELIN, THE BEGINNING OF DIPLOMACY: A SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDY OF INTERTRIBAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 296-97 (1950).
9 ABBA EBAN, THE NEW DIPLOMlACY: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN THE
MODERN AGE 335 (1983).
10 GRANT V. MCCLANAHAN, DIPLOMATIC IMUNrrY: PRINCIPLES,
PRACTICES, PROBLEMS 34 (1989). Prior to 1708, Britain had no formal
legislation in place concerning diplomatic immunity. Id. After the
Ambassador was released on bail, Queen Anne expressed her regrets through
1998 329
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the Great learned of this incident, he forced Lord Whitworth, the
British Ambassador, to convey to the Czar, at a public audience,
Queen Anne's regret for the insult to the Ambassador." In an
attempt to quell the Czar's anger, the Act of Anne of 17082 was
enacted, stating that all writs and processes to arrest or imprison
ambassadors or their servants were null and void. 3 This Act was
controlling until 1964, when Britain's Diplomatic Privileges
Act,14 the British adaptation of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 1961 [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"],
was adopted.
The American Colonies adopted the Act of Anne 5 until
Congress passed a law in 1790 that was more comprehensive than
the Act of Anne.' 6  This law made it an offense to arrest an
the Secretary of State. Id. The Ambassador was not impressed, threatened all
who committed the offense to arrest and left Britain. Id.
" Id. When Peter the Great learned of the offense, he demanded to Lord
Whitworth that those involved be executed. Id.
Queen Anne commissioned Lord Whitworth to convey her regrets to Peter the
Great at a public audience. Id.
12 Id. In a further effort to quell the anger of Peter the Great, the Act of Anne
was enacted in 1708. Id. This Act was later "interpreted as declaratory of the
common law." Id. See also Diplomatic Privileges Act, 7 Anne, ch. XII
(1708).
13 GRANT V. MCCLANAHAN, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: PRINCIPLES,
PRACTICES, PROBLEMS, 34 (1989).
"4 Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964, 12 & 13, Eliz. 2, ch. 81. This Act
incorporates the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention into English
law. The United Kingdom was a signator to the Vienna Convention on
December 11, 1961. The United Kingdom ratified the Vienna Convention on
September 1, 1964. See also Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.T.S. 95.
'5 Diplomatic Privileges Act, 7 Anne, ch. XII (1708).
16 See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 117 (1790). This Act
provides in pertinent part:
[i]f any writ or process shall at any time hereafter be sued
forth or prosecuted by any person or persons, in any of the
courts of the United States, or... of a particular
state ... such writ or process shall be deemed or adjudged
to be utterly null and void to all intents, construction and
purpose whatsoever.
Id. This Act was formally codified as 22 U.S.C. § 252.
[Vol 15
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ambassador or to seize his goods. 7 Any person who issued or
executed an order to do so was subject to penalty." This statute
was in force until December 13, 1972, when the Vienna
Convention was entered into force in the United States.' 9 It is
still controlling today.
The Vienna Convention 0 is the seminal text on modem
diplomatic relations and begins by "[riecalling that peoples of all
nations from ancient times have recognized the status of
diplomatic agents." 21 The Vienna Convention carries forth into
17 Id.
Is Id.
19 GRANT V. MCCLANAHAN, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNrTY: PRINCIPLES,
PRACTICES, PROBLEMS 35 (1989). The Vienna Convention was entered into
force by the Presidential Proclamation of Richard M. Nixon. See Presidential
Proclamation of 24 November 1972, Dept. of State, United States Treaties and
Other International Agreements, vol. 23, pp. 3227-28. The Senate had
advised ratification for the resolution on September 14, 1965
20 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.T.S. 95.
21 Id. The Preamble of the Vienna Convention provides:
[t]he State Parties to the present Convention,
Recalling that peoples of all nations from ancient times have
recognized the status of diplomatic agents,
Having in mind the purposes and the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations concerning the sovereign
equality of States, the maintenance of international peace and
security, and the promotion of friendly relations among
nations,
Believing that an international convention on diplomatic
intercourse, privileges and immunities would contribute to
the development of friendly relations among nations,
irrespective of their differing constitutional and social
systems,
Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities
is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient
performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as
representing States,
Affirming that the rules of customary international law
should continue to govern questions not expressly regulated
by the provisions of the present Convention,
Have agreed as follows:
1998
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the modem era the policies and concepts developed throughout
history.
REMEDIES
I. Executive Remedies
The Executive branch of the United States Federal Government
has the authority to not recognize foreign governments and to
take sanctions when necessary." While no one would expect the
President to withdraw recognition due to unpaid parking tickets,
sanctions are a possibility. Diplomats are not exempt from the
laws of the host nation. 3 The diplomats who have abused their
privileges have been notified of their indiscretions via the receipt
of parking and traffic summonses and have the opportunity to be
heard in the American judicial system to plead their defenses.
Still, though, these many summonses have been ignored.24
22 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. This section provides:
[the president) shall from time to time give to the Congress
Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to
their Consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene
both Houses, or either of them, and in Cases of
Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall
think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United
States.
Id.
2 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art XLI,
23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Art. XLI provides in relevant part,
"without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all
persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and
regulations of the receiving State." Id.
24 In 1996, diplomats ignored 134,281 tickets in the City of New York. See
Larry McShane, No Detente in NYC's War on UNITED NATIONS Scofflaws,
TIMES UNION, April 12, 1997, at B2.
332 [Vol 15
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While the Vienna Convention does provide diplomats with
immunity from prosecution,' the spirit of the agreement was to
prevent compromising the inviolability of the missions and their
diplomats, and to ensure a safe working environment for foreign
diplomats in the United States as well as Americans in other
nations, not for the hauteur of the diplomats in New York City in
their observance of parking and traffic laws.26  In addition,
driving is a privilege, not a right, reserved for those of the
requisite age, competence and responsibility necessary to
properly perform the complex skills and duties involved with the
operation of a motor vehicle.' Diplomats are expected to obey
the local traffic laws and regulations, and pay fines incurred
' See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art.
XXXI, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Art. XXXI provides in relevant
part, "[a] diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction
of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction." Id.
26 See id. art. XXII. Art. XXII provides in relevant part:
[t]he premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents
of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the
consent of the head of the mission ... The premises of the
mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the
means of transportation of the mission shall be immune from
search, requisition, attachment or execution.
Id. See also Art. XXIX, which provides "[t]he person of a diplomatic agent
shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.
The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity." Id.
See also Preamble, which states "[r]ealizing that the purpose of such privileges
and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient
performance of functions by consular functions on behalf of their respective
States.. ." Id.
27 See NEW YORK VEH. & TRAF. LAw, § 502 (McKinney 1996/1997). The
requirements for licensing for use of motor vehicles in New York is governed
by New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 502, requiring an application,
fee, proof of identity, age and fitness and written and road tests. Id.
1998 333
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through the violation of these ordinances. 28 Failure to comply
may result in the loss of driving privileges.29
In a circular note to the Chiefs of Missions at Washington,
former Secretary of State George P. Shultz stated that the
Department of State would no longer request cancellation of
traffic citations on behalf of diplomatic missions. 30  The
Department of State also requested the cooperation of the Chiefs
of Missions in resolving the parking problem as well as the
unpaid fine situation, which had been hindering the Department's
efforts to uphold "community understanding and acceptance of
diplomatic privileges and immunities. "3 In another
correspondence, former Secretary Shultz stated that while
diplomats have immunity from jurisdiction, states do not have to
grant the privilege of driving to diplomats if that privilege is
abused.32 Through the expectation of reciprocity, the Department
of State, in keeping a policy that its representatives pay its fines
for traffic violations expects foreign sovereigns to adopt the same
policy.33 The Department of State requests local jurisdictions to
maintain records concerning these indiscretions and to
communicate them directly to the Department. Thereafter, the
Office of Foreign Missions reviews the nature and extent of these
" See Marian Nash (Leich), Motor Vehicles: Traffic Citations and Fines, 88
AM. J. INT'L. L. (1994).29 Id. See also NEW YORK VEH & TRAP. LAW, § 51 1-d(2) (McKinney 1996).
This statute governs the suspension of driving privileges in the State of New
York and provides in relevant part:
A person may be prosecuted for a violation of this section in
any court of competent jurisdiction in any county: (a) in
which more than ten tickets which resulted in suspension for
failure to answer, appear or pay fines issued, or (b) in which
the twentieth or any subsequent ticket which resulted in a
suspension for failure to answer, appear or pay a fine was
issued.
Id.
30 See Circular Note from George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, to Chiefs of
Missions, File No. P84 0091-0626 (July 2, 1984).
31 Id.
32 See Circular Note from George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, to Chiefs of
Missions, File No. P85 0001-0980 (December 17, 1984).
33 Id.
[Vol 15
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violations. 34 The Department then makes a judgment whether
such violations indicate a flagrant disregard for the laws of the
United States, and whether the individual shall be permitted to
continue to operate a motor vehicle in this country."
In 1993, another circular from the Department stated:
Persons enjoying privileges and immunities in the United States
are nevertheless obliged to respect United States laws and
regulations... The operation of a motor vehicle in the United
States by such a person is not a right but a privilege that may be
withdrawn in cases of abuse... The Department will withhold
registration renewals of vehicles with unpaid or unadjudicated
parking tickets issued on or after [January 1, 1994] that are more
than one year old.36
This policy permits the towing of a diplomat's vehicle if the
vehicle is deemed to create a safety hazard.37  Should an
inviolable vehicle of a mission or mission member be towed, the
Department of State will have the vehicle promptly released.3"
While this policy may be an adequate deterrence, it may not be
enough. The Department may still act, though, by having the
most egregious diplomats deemed persona non grata and have his
function terminated. 39  This remedy should be used wisely to
avoid a punitive response by the affected country.
3 Id.
35 Id.
36 See Circular Note from the Department of State to Chiefs of Missions, P94
0003-0388 (December 22, 1993).
1 See Marian Nash (Leich), Motor Vehicles:Trafflc Citations and Fines, 88
AM. J. INT'L. L. 312 (1994).
Safety hazards are deemed to be in a no parking zone during
a morning or afternoon rush hour; in a loading zone; in an
emergency no parking zone; in front of a fire hydrant; on a
sidewalk; in a bus zone; in a handicapped zone; obstructing
an intersection; or blocking a crosswalk.
Id.
18 See Circular Note from the Department of State to Chiefs of Missions, P94
0003-0388 (December 22, 1993).
39 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. IX,
23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Art. IX provides:
1998 335
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New York City can take advantage of these processes by
maintaining records of the violations and corresponding with the
Office of Foreign Missions. With millions of dollars in unpaid
tickets, 4° including some individual countries owing hundreds of
thousands of dollars,4 the "nature and extent" of these violations
should be enough to spur the Department of State into action to
revoke driving privileges. The threat alone may make
compliance of the traffic and parking laws more attainable.
The City of New York has taken steps, through an alliance with
the State Department, to hold diplomatic violators who fail to pay
valid parking tickets responsible as scofflaws by the State
Department.4 2 Diplomats will be deemed scofflaws if they have
not paid a valid parking ticket within one year.43 The State
Department's Office of Foreign Missions would notify the
diplomat that the "diplomatic vehicle cannot be legally operated
until the violation is properly adjudicated with the City."' The
Consulate of Mission would then be asked by the State
Department to turn in the "diplomatic plates in question until the
scofflaw status is removed. "45 A scofflaw's diplomatic vehicle
The receiving State may at any time and without having to
explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of
the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the
mission is persona non grata, or that any other member of
the staff is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending
State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned
or terminate his function with the mission.
Id.
o In 1996, diplomats accrued over $6 million in unpaid parking tickets. See
Larry McShane, No Ditente in NYC's War on U.N. Scofflaws, TIMES MIRROR,
April 12, 1997, at B2.
" In the first three months of 1997 alone, Russia accrued $528,000, Ukraine,
$47,000, Bulgaria, $89,000, and Indonesia, $83,000 in fines. See New York
Delays Crackdown on Parking-Scofflaw Diplomats, ORLANDO SENTINEL, April
19, 1997, at A8.
42 Press Release from Office of the Mayor, City of New York, Mayor
Guiliani Announces Agreement Between City and State Department on Stricter
Diplomatic Parking Rules, Release # 124-97, March 10, 1997.
43 Id.
"Id.
45 Id.
336 [Vol 15
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may be towed and the diplomatic plates will be forwarded to the
Regional Office of the State Department Office of Foreign
Missions. 46  While this policy is proactive, no penalty is
enumerated. 47 In fact, no penalty would be enforceable under
Article XXXI of the Vienna Convention .4  The towing of a
diplomat's vehicle would likewise violate Article XXII(3) of the
Vienna Convention, which protects the inviolability of the
mission's means of transport.49
The State Department realized this quandary and rescinded the
policy on April 18, 1997. o Diplomats claimed that the policy
violated their diplomatic immunity, and thus, violated
international law.5 ' A compromise plan was in negotiation,
whereby United Nations missions with scofflaw diplomats would
be refused additional license plates and vehicle renewal.5 Mayor
Guiliani reclaimed, for public use, additional diplomatic parking
spaces that had been set aside as agreed in the April 1, 1997
pact. 3 Since then, Mayor Guiliani has dared the United Nations
to relocate, threatening to use the site for housing and
development.54
It is clear from the prior attempts to rectify this situation, the
Department of State recognizes how tenuous this situation is.
46 id.
47 Id.
48 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. XXXI, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Art. XXXI provides in relevant part "[a)
diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative
jurisdiction." Id.
49 See id. art. XXH (1) which provides in relevant part, "[t]he premises of the
mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of
transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment
or execution." Id.
50 See Diplomatic Parking Crackdown Ended, ORLANDO SENTINEL, April 19,
1997, at B2.
51 Id.
52 Id.
.5Id.
5 Id.
1998
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With further diplomacy, though, strides can be made to foster
cooperation by the United Nations member states.
II. Legislative Remedies
The Constitution gives Congress the power to remedy the
problem created by the diplomats' insolence. "Congress has the
power to enact statutes abrogating prior treaties or international
obligations entered into by the United States."" In fact, the
courts have specifically passed on ruling on such issues, instead
deferring to the legislature. "Congress is the branch of
government best suited to address the array of concerns involving
altering the Vienna Convention. 5 6 The Diplomatic Relations Act
of 1978'7 was enacted to deal with more flagrant abuses of
diplomatic privileges. 8 The 1978 Act gives Congress and the
President the power to limit the inviolability of the mission.
Nevertheless, neither Congress nor the President has exercised
this power.59 The author believes that this situation calls for
action now, before diplomatic indiscretions become more
abundant and severe.
New York's Congressional Representatives can introduce a bill
that would enforce the fines imposed upon the missions due to
parking and traffic infractions. The bill could submit diplomatic
scofflaws to arrest 6° or garnishment.61 While the United States'
" United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456,
1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
56 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Zaire, 988 F.2d 295, 302 (2d Cir. 1993).
'7 22 U.S.C. § 254 (a)-(e) (1988). The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978
gives the President, on the basis of reciprocity, the power to establish
privileges and immunities for missions and their members. This results in
more favorable or less favorable treatment than is provided under the Vienna
Convention.
58 Id.
" 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Zaire, 988 F.2d 295, 302 (2d Cir. 1993).
60 This action would override the operation of Article XXIX of the Vienna
Convention, which states "[t]he person of a diplomatic agent shall be
inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The
338 [Vol 15
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primary concern regarding diplomatic immunity is to ensure the
protection of its dignitaries abroad, a policy of reciprocity would
keep all nations on an even plane, as the United States would
guarantee the payment of traffic and parking fines of its
representatives in host nations.
Another alternative would be for New York City to seek a
remedy similar to that available in the District of Columbia. In
the District of Columbia, another area experiencing diplomatic
arrogation, § 574 of the Foreign Operators, Export Financing and
Related Programs Appropriation Act was enacted, whereby one
hundred ten percent (110%) of the amount of unpaid fines owed
would be withheld from that country's foreign aid. This would
ensure that the City of New York would receive the monies owed
prior to that nation receiving any aid from Congress. The policy
has been quite successful to date, with "97% of parking tickets
get[ting] paid" in the District of Columbia, Maryland and
Virginia. 63
In fact, the House International Relations Committee approved a
bill, sponsored by New York Republican Representative Peter T.
King, very similar to the aforementioned Act, whereby aid would
be withheld from those states with unpaid parking violations. 4
receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate
steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity" as well as
Article XXXI (1), which states "[a] diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity
from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity
from its civil and administrative jurisdiction." See Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, art.
XXXI (1).
6 Again, this would contradict Article XXII (3) of the Vienna Convention,
which states "[tihe premises of the mission, their furnishing thereon and the
means of transportation of the mission shall be immune from search,
requisition, attachment or execution." See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, art. XI (3).
62 Pub. L. No. 103-87, 107 Stat. 931 (approved September 30 1993). This
Act provides that the Secretary of State must certify to Congress that all such
fines and penalties owed as of September 30, 1993, have been fully paid
before amounts withheld can be released. Id.
63 Susan Ferrechio, Congress May Help N.Y. Fine Diplomars, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, May 11, 1997, at A4.
64 Id.
1998
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Further, "foreign missions and consulates in New York would
lose one registration for every car with tickets left unpaid for a
year."6 This bill was not passed, however, because the
"Republican majority could not muster the votes needed for
passage" as to the amount of foreign aid funding.6 It is
encouraging to note that diplomatic indiscretion is deemed serious
enough to be considered on the floor of Congress.
I. Judicial Remedies
Congress has given the judiciary power to act upon foreign
sovereigns in the enacting of The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act [hereinafter "FSIA"],67 establishing when states or federal
courts may exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. 68  This
Act, however, is "subject to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party at the time of the enactment of
this Act."'69 Thus, Congress did not intend the FSIA to affect the
65Id.
' Tom Carter, Republican Split Destroyed Deal on Bill for Foreign Aid, THE
WASHINGTON TIMEs, June 6, 1997, at A17.
67 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976). § 1602 provides in relevant part:
[t]he Congress finds that the determination by United States
courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the
jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice
and would protect the rights of both foreign states and
litigants in the United States courts. Under international law,
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts
insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their
commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction
of judgments rendered against them in connection with their
commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity
should henceforth be decided by the courts of the United
States and of the States in conformity with the principles set
forth in this chapter.
Id.
6' Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996).
69 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976). § 1609 provides in relevant part.
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act,
the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be
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Vienna Convention. 0 When confronted with the interpretation of
this Act, courts have reasoned that "[tihe primary purpose of this
chapter was to depoliticize sovereign immunity decisions by
transferring them from the Executive to the Judicial branch of the
government, thereby assuring litigants that such decisions would
be made on legal rather than political grounds." 7 In addition,
scholarly commentary has surmised that "the courts are not
bound to accept the State Department's conclusions of law
concerning statutory interpretation and constitutionality."' Thus,
courts are free to interpret statutes and treaties when confronted
with actions concerning diplomats. There have been decisions by
the courts that have limited diplomatic immunity. The court in
Tabion v. Muftil3 noted that "[d]iplomatic immunity does not
provide an unconstrained license to violate contracts and United
States laws." 74 While the court ultimately found for the diplomat
on a "commercial activity" theory, 75 the opinion as to the
immune from attachment, arrest and execution except as
provided in §§ 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.
Id.
70 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, pt. 12 (1976).
"' National Airmotive Corp. v. Government and State of Iran, 499 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1980).
72- 4 AM. JuR. 2D Ambassadors, Diplomats and Consular Officials, § 7
(1995).
73 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996). Appellant, a domestic from the Philippines,
was employed by appellees for two years. Id. at 536. Appellee, Faris Mufti
held the position of First Secretary, and later Counselor, of the Jordanian
Embassy in Washington, D.C. Id. Appellant brought suit in federal district
court against her employers, the appellees, alleging breach of contract,
intentional misrepresentation in employment, false imprisonment, violations of
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985 (3) and Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29
U.S.C. § 201 et seq., violations. Id. Appellant sought compensatory and
punitive damages as well as attorney's fees and costs. Id. The district court
found that the case was barred by the Vienna Convention, which protected
appellees via diplomatic immunity and thus, quashed the service of process.
Id. Appellant appealed. Id. Finding that the "apparent inequity to a private
individual is outweighed by the great injury to the public that would arise from
permitting suit against [a sovereign] or its agents," the court affirmed the
lower court's ruling, thus dismissing the appellants suit. Id. at 539.
74 Id.
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obligations of a diplomat was well reasoned, finding that
diplomats do, in fact, have an obligation to abide by local laws.76
While the court in Liberia Eastern Timber Corp. v. The
Government of the Republic of Liberia7 found that embassy bank
accounts were immune from attachment under the Vienna
Convention, with no exception enumerated under FSIA,78 the
' See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art.
XXXI, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, which provides "three exceptions
to a diplomat's civil immunity." Tabion, 73 F.3d at 537. Specifically at issue
in Tabion is Article XXXI, (1)(c), which excludes immunity for actions
"relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions." Id.
(quoting 23 U.S.T. at 3241). Further, Article XLI of the Vienna Convention
provides, in relevant part, "[a] diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State
practice for personal profit any professional or commercial activity." Id.
(quoting 23 U.S.T. at 3247). But nowhere in the Vienna Convention is
"commercial activity" defined. Id. Struggling with the black letter of the
Treaty, the intent of the drafters and historical relevance, the court concluded
that "commercial activity" did "not encompass contractual relationships for
goods and services incidental to the daily life of the diplomat and family in the
receiving State. Id. at 538.
76 Id. The Tabion court encountered many obstacles in reaching its decision
and did not turn a blind eye to the inherent unfairness to the individual in such
a scheme. The court, however, reasoned through all the obstacles, including
the black letter of the treaty, the intent of the framers, the historical
perspective, the commercial activity theory as well as other treaties and
statutes that were enacted in conjunction with and subsequent to the
proclamation of the Vienna Convention before reaching its decision.
7' 659 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C. 1987).
71 Id. Plaintiff obtained an ex parte order in the United States District Court,
Southern District of New York, directing the entry of a judgment obtained in
arbitration against defendant, The Government of the Republic of Liberia
[hereinafter "Liberia"]. Id. at 607. Liberia sought to enjoin plaintiff from
executing the judgment in the aforementioned Court. Id. That Court held that
plaintiff was to "be enjoined from issuing executions against certain
government property, but also ruled that [plaintiff] 'is not enjoined from
issuing executions with respect to any properties which are also used for
commercial activities and that may fall within one of the exceptions delineated
in [28 U.S.C.] § 1610.'" Id. Plaintiff recorded their judgment in the United
States District Court, District of Columbia, and that Court issued writs of
attachment, notifying banks that the writs seized any credits other than wages,
salary, commissions or pensions of the defendant, The Government of the
Republic of Liberia, The Republic of Liberia, or The Embassy of the
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court in Birch Shipping v. Embassy of the Republic of Tanzania?
held otherwise, opining that bank accounts of diplomats were not
unconditionally immune from attachment to satisfy civil
judgments.'
Republic... of Liberia or any of their agencies, that are used for commercial
activities as such activities are defined in Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of
the Republic of Tanzania (sic), 507 F. Supp. 332 (sic) (D.D.C. 1980),
sufficient to satisfy the judgment against Liberia. Id. Two bank accounts used
for the function of the Liberian Embassy were seized as a result of the writs.
Id. at 607-08. The Court held that "the bank accounts of the Liberian
Embassy are immune from attachment both because they enjoy diplomaticimmunity under the Vienna Convention and because no exception of the FSIA
applies to deprive the bank accounts of their grant of sovereign immunity."
Id. at 611. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1062-1611
(1976). The Court held that "Congress did not intend the FSIA to affect
diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention." See also H. R. REP. No.
94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted at 1976 U.S.C.C.A. 6604.
79 507 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980).
' Id. The Embassy of the Republic of Tanzania, entered into a contract with
Birch Shipping for the shipment of corn. Id. at 311. The agreement required
the parties to submit to arbitration and agree that a judgment may be entered.
Id. A dispute arose and was thereafter arbitrated in New York, resulting in the
plaintiff obtaining a money judgment. Id. Pursuant to the United States
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9, plaintiff petitioned the United States District
Court, Southern District of New York to confirm said award and enter
judgment. Id. Defendant did not appear, and plaintiff's petition was granted.
Id. A judgment was registered in the United States District Court, District of
Columbia, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Id. A writ of garnishment was
obtained, and served upon defendant's bank. Id. Defendant moved to quash
the writ, claiming that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976), its property was immune from attachment and
not within the exceptions enumerated in § 1610. Id. The court held that by
agreeing to arbitration, defendant implicitly waived its immunity, and thus,
could not be unilaterally withdrawn. Id .at 312. The court denied defendants
motion to quash the writ. Id. at 313. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1610. § 1610
provides:
[t]he property in the United States of a foreign state, as
defined in § 1603 (a) of this chapter, used for commercial
activity in the United States, shall not be immune to
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a
judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State
after the effective date of this Act, if
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There are many judicial remedies available to the City of New
York to enforce and collect the outstanding fines. Article 41 of
the Vienna Convention states that all diplomats have a duty to
respect all of the laws of the receiving state.8 The Vienna
Convention "is agreed to be largely confirmatory of existing
customary law."' Enforcement, however, is easier said than
done.
Did the "existing customary law" contemplate diplomats
parking and driving illegally, causing safety hazards and traffic
nightmares and running up huge unpaid fines? And if this was,
in fact, contemplated, must New York City suffer interminably
because a thirty-seven year old treaty did not appropriately
contend with this growing dilemma? Our judiciary exercises its
intuitive judgment consistently in interpreting statutes, creating
new law based on public policy and overturning prior decisions
that no longer make sense. The City of New York should bring
this issue before the courts, and ask the judiciary to interpret
these statutes, consider public policy and overturn prior decisions
that no longer make sense. While the courts have thus far been
reluctant to limit diplomatic immunity, it is clear that the court is
not comfortable with the intemperance currently enjoyed by
diplomats.
the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in
aid of execution or from execution either explicitly or by
implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance
with the terms of the waiver.
Id.
"' Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. XLI, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. This Article states "[w]ithout prejudice to
their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such
privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving
State." Id.
12 See Memorandum from the Secretariat, Diplomatic Intercourse and
Immunities, U.N. Doc. A/C.N. 4/98 (1956).
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CONCLUSION
New York City has the three branches of the Federal
Government at its disposal in seeking a remedy to receive the
millions of dollars now owed, due to unpaid parking and traffic
tickets of diplomats. The President has the power to sanction.83
The Department of State has policies in place to coerce these
nations to pay their outstanding fines by withholding foreign aid
and preventing negligent diplomats from operating a motor
vehicle.84 Congress can enact legislation to allow jurisdiction to
enforce these outstanding fines. The courts have the power to
interpret the statutes now in place, make decisions based upon
public policy and overturn prior decisions that just do not make
sense anymore.
The battle is difficult, however, as the concerns for the safety
and well being of our American brothers and sisters overseas is
very profound. As with all acts of diplomacy, there is a fine line
that one must balance upon. Millions of dollars in the coffers of
New York City could be a very shortsighted proposition.
Sensitive alliances may be lost. New adversaries may be created.
American lives could be lost. And, as far as economics are
concerned, too much pressure applied to the United Nations and
its members could break a tenuous relationship that now exists
between the United Nations, the United States and the City of
New York. How many millions would be lost to the City of New
York should the United Nations relocate?8
83 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, supra, note 22.
4 See Department of State Circular Notes, supra, notes 30, 32 and 36.
s The contribution from the United Nations, its agencies, diplomats and
consular corps into the economy of New York City (as of 1997) amounts to
$3.2 billion per year. Further, 30,600 jobs have been generated from the
United Nations in New York City, yielding $1.2 billion in annual earnings (as
of 1997). See About the United Nations, (visited August 18, 1998)
<http://www.un.org./aboutun.org>. Further, "New York City experiences
an annual net gain of $830.7 million due to the presence of the United Nations,
despite incurring additional costs due to real property tax exemptions,
uncollected parking fines and expenditures on extraordinary police protection."
See G.M. Sorenson, On Diplomats, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1989, at 53, col. 1.
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But there does come a time when infidelity can no longer be
tolerated. American diplomats abroad are expected to act in
accordance with local laws and customs. Diplomacy relies on
quid pro quo. The fragile structure of international relations can
be eviscerated over a parking ticket. The stakes are that high. If
the United Nations, the world's police force, is expected to
maintain world peace and quell international discourse, the least it
should be able to do is police its diplomatic force.
Phil Felice*
* The author would like to thank Dawn Felice for her patience,
encouragement and support, Ricky Cantwell for his patience, and
understanding, Dean Kenneth Rosenblum for considering "the big picture" and
Professor Peter Zablotsky, Dr. Deborah Hecht, Esther Schonfeld and Erin
Sidaras for their input, encouragement and support.
346 [Vol 15
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 1, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss1/11
